Pritchardean ED-P characterizes paradigmatic perceptual knowledge as supported by factive and reflectively accessible rational support, thereby combining externalist and internalist requirements.

Pritchardean ED-P characterizes paradigmatic perceptual knowledge as supported by factive and reflectively accessible rational support, thereby combining externalist and internalist requirements.

• In paradigmatic perceptual knowledge, ED-P requires S to have factive and reflectively accessible rational support for believing p.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  S must believe that p in virtue of having rational support R which entails that p and is reflectively accessible to S

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p1

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  S must believe that p in virtue of having rational support R which entails that p and is reflectively accessible to S

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p1
• Ordinary justification of a perceptual belief that p commonly appeals to seeing that p; ED-P can accommodate this because seeing that p is factive and reflectively knowable.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  a common practice in justifying one ’ s perceptual belief that p is to appeal to her seeing that p

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p4

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  a common practice in justifying one ’ s perceptual belief that p is to appeal to her seeing that p

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p4
• Reflective accessibility supplies an internalist constraint: grounds for knowledgeable beliefs must be accessible to the subject.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  reflective accessibility is an internalist requirement which constrains grounds for our beliefs to be knowledgeable to us

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p2

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  reflective accessibility is an internalist requirement which constrains grounds for our beliefs to be knowledgeable to us

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p2
• Factivity supplies an externalist constraint connecting knowledge with truth-conducive belief formation.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  factivity is an externalist requirement according to which truth conducive belief formation is necessarily connected with knowledge

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p3

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  factivity is an externalist requirement according to which truth conducive belief formation is necessarily connected with knowledge

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p3
• The access problem appears because ED-P supports reflection-based knowledge that one's reason is factive, and reflection-based knowledge that the reason entails p; with closure, this would yield reflection-only knowledge of empirical p.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  ED-P seems to imply the odd consequence that empirical facts can be known by reflection alone.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p7
• ED-P rejects UP1 for paradigmatic perceptual beliefs: S's factive support is unavailable to her envatted counterpart and is therefore better support, favouring p over the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  S has rational support that does favour the belief that p over the brain in a vat hypothesis.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p6

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  S has rational support that does favour the belief that p over the brain in a vat hypothesis.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p6
• The underdetermination sceptical paradox combines the claims that no support favours everyday perceptual proposition E over incompatible sceptical hypothesis H, that lacking such favouring support precludes rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, and that widespread perceptual knowledge exists.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  each of the statements in the underdetermination-based sceptical paradox regarding perceptual knowledge is plausible

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p5

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  each of the statements in the underdetermination-based sceptical paradox regarding perceptual knowledge is plausible

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p5

Critical questions are the challenges this argument’s reasoning pattern must withstand.

• Does the case fit the category?
  Answer

  The paper characterizes paradigmatic perceptual knowledge as requiring rational support that is both factive and reflectively accessible. It presents these as the defining features of the Pritchardean disjunctivist category. Paper basis — "S must believe that p in virtue of having rational support R which entails that p and is reflectively accessible to S" (An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge, p. 3). Reconstructed from Kwok Chung Him et al. (2023); machine-drafted from the paper, filed for review.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p1

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