In paradigmatic perceptual knowledge, ED-P requires S to have factive and reflectively accessible rational support for believing p.
Evidence (2)
An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems
S must believe that p in virtue of having rational support R which entails that p and is reflectively accessible to S
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p1
An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems
S must believe that p in virtue of having rational support R which entails that p and is reflectively accessible to S
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p1
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