The access problem appears because ED-P supports reflection-based knowledge that one's reason is factive, and reflection-based knowledge that the reason entails p; with closure, this would yield reflection-only knowledge of empirical p.

Evidence (1)

An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

ED-P seems to imply the odd consequence that empirical facts can be known by reflection alone.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p7

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