ED-P is theoretically attractive because it fits ordinary appeals to seeing that p, addresses underdetermination scepticism, and has proposed replies to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems.

ED-P is theoretically attractive because it fits ordinary appeals to seeing that p, addresses underdetermination scepticism, and has proposed replies to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems.

• Pritchardean ED-P characterizes paradigmatic perceptual knowledge as supported by factive and reflectively accessible rational support, thereby combining externalist and internalist requirements.
• In paradigmatic perceptual knowledge, ED-P requires S to have factive and reflectively accessible rational support for believing p.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  S must believe that p in virtue of having rational support R which entails that p and is reflectively accessible to S

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p1

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  S must believe that p in virtue of having rational support R which entails that p and is reflectively accessible to S

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p1
• Ordinary justification of a perceptual belief that p commonly appeals to seeing that p; ED-P can accommodate this because seeing that p is factive and reflectively knowable.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  a common practice in justifying one ’ s perceptual belief that p is to appeal to her seeing that p

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p4

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  a common practice in justifying one ’ s perceptual belief that p is to appeal to her seeing that p

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p4
• Reflective accessibility supplies an internalist constraint: grounds for knowledgeable beliefs must be accessible to the subject.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  reflective accessibility is an internalist requirement which constrains grounds for our beliefs to be knowledgeable to us

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p2

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  reflective accessibility is an internalist requirement which constrains grounds for our beliefs to be knowledgeable to us

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p2
• Factivity supplies an externalist constraint connecting knowledge with truth-conducive belief formation.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  factivity is an externalist requirement according to which truth conducive belief formation is necessarily connected with knowledge

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p3

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  factivity is an externalist requirement according to which truth conducive belief formation is necessarily connected with knowledge

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p3
• ED-P rejects UP1 for paradigmatic perceptual beliefs: S's factive support is unavailable to her envatted counterpart and is therefore better support, favouring p over the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  S has rational support that does favour the belief that p over the brain in a vat hypothesis.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p6

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  S has rational support that does favour the belief that p over the brain in a vat hypothesis.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p6
• The underdetermination sceptical paradox combines the claims that no support favours everyday perceptual proposition E over incompatible sceptical hypothesis H, that lacking such favouring support precludes rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, and that widespread perceptual knowledge exists.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  each of the statements in the underdetermination-based sceptical paradox regarding perceptual knowledge is plausible

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p5

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Pritchardean perceptual disjunctivism: formulation, advantages, and responses to its standard problems

  each of the statements in the underdetermination-based sceptical paradox regarding perceptual knowledge is plausible

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p5

These are challenges this argument’s reasoning pattern must still withstand. Answering them on Isonomia strengthens the argument.

• Are the stated good consequences likely to occur?Answer under review
  Draft answer

  The paper argues that factive support available to the ordinary perceiver but unavailable to an envatted counterpart favours the everyday proposition over the sceptical hypothesis. It also maintains that ED-P accommodates ordinary justification by seeing that p. Paper basis — "S has rational support that does favour the belief that p over the brain in a vat hypothesis." (An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge, p. 4). Reconstructed from Kwok Chung Him et al. (2023); machine-drafted from the paper, filed for review.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2-p6
• Are the good consequences significant enough to justify A?Answer under review
  Draft answer

  The paper's evaluative warrant treats the explanatory and anti-sceptical advantages as reasons to adopt the account unless a plausible objection defeats it. Thus it presents these consequences as theoretically weighty, subject to its stated defeater condition. Paper basis — Theoretical evaluation and rebuttal warrant: an account should be adopted when it delivers the stated explanatory and anti-sceptical advantages, unless a plausible objection defeats it; Pritchard's replies block each objection by denying its crucial inference or premise (reflection-only acquisition in the access case, a discriminative-ability requirement in the distinguishability case, and SK in t (from unit-2#w; no verbatim anchor). Reconstructed from Kwok Chung Him et al. (2023); machine-drafted from the paper, filed for review.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-2#w
• Are there overlooked negative side‑effects outweighing the good?Open

Cited by 1 · 0 contests