Disjunctivism can be extended beyond perceptual knowledge, so a unified Pritchardean account of memory knowledge is a viable project if the perceptual account is viable.

Disjunctivism can be extended beyond perceptual knowledge, so a unified Pritchardean account of memory knowledge is a viable project if the perceptual account is viable.

• ED-P is theoretically attractive because it fits ordinary appeals to seeing that p, addresses underdetermination scepticism, and has proposed replies to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems.
• The authors' case for memory disjunctivism will draw on distinctions among memory types and among memory's roles in knowledge acquisition, together with parity with Pritchard's defence of perceptual disjunctivism.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Framing the project: extending epistemological disjunctivism to memory

  We make our case with reference to different sorts of memory, as well as the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, in conjunction with an argument from parity with Pritchard ’ s defence of disjunctivism of perceptual knowledge.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-1-p4
• Pritchard recognizes that a convincing disjunctivist account of knowledge in general may be possible.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Framing the project: extending epistemological disjunctivism to memory

  it may even be possible, as Pritchard (2012) recognises, to promote a convincing disjunctivist account of knowledge in general.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-1-p3
• In paradigmatic perceptual-knowledge cases, ED-P holds that an agent's rational support is both factive and reflectively accessible.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Framing the project: extending epistemological disjunctivism to memory

  an agent, S , has perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R , for her belief that p which is both factive

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-1-p1
• Milburn and Moon maintain that there cannot be a convincing unified epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge, but only disjunctivisms for particular memory types; the authors propose to answer this objection.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Framing the project: extending epistemological disjunctivism to memory

  They hold that there cannot be a convincing unified epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge, but rather only a disjunctivism of particular sorts of memory knowledge.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-1-p5
• Epistemological disjunctivism need not be confined to perceptual knowledge: McDowell offers a disjunctivist account of testimonial knowledge based on perceptual disjunctivism.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Framing the project: extending epistemological disjunctivism to memory

  McDowell (1998) offers a disjunctivist account of testimonial knowledge, which is based on his disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-1-p2

Critical questions are the challenges this argument’s reasoning pattern must withstand.

• Are there critical differences?
  Answer

  The paper considers Milburn and Moon's challenge that only disjunctivisms for particular memory types, rather than a unified account, are possible. The authors state that their account will answer this objection while attending to distinctions among memory types. Paper basis — "They hold that there cannot be a convincing unified epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge, but rather only a disjunctivism of particular sorts of memory knowledge." (An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge, p. 2). Reconstructed from Kwok Chung Him et al. (2023); machine-drafted from the paper, filed for review.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-1-p5

These are challenges this argument’s reasoning pattern must still withstand. Answering them on Isonomia strengthens the argument.

• Are the relevant similarities strong?Answer under review
  Draft answer

  The paper proposes parity with Pritchard's defence of perceptual disjunctivism, together with distinctions among memory types and memory's knowledge-acquiring roles. It takes these structural considerations to support an analogous treatment of memory. Paper basis — "We make our case with reference to different sorts of memory, as well as the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, in conjunction with an argument from parity with Pritchard ’ s defence of disjunctivism of perceptual knowledge." (An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge, p. 2). Reconstructed from Kwok Chung Him et al. (2023); machine-drafted from the paper, filed for review.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-1-p4

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