In paradigmatic perceptual-knowledge cases, ED-P holds that an agent's rational support is both factive and reflectively accessible.

Evidence (1)

An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Framing the project: extending epistemological disjunctivism to memory

an agent, S , has perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R , for her belief that p which is both factive

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-1-p1

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