Epistemological disjunctivism need not be confined to perceptual knowledge: McDowell offers a disjunctivist account of testimonial knowledge based on perceptual disjunctivism.

Evidence (1)

An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Framing the project: extending epistemological disjunctivism to memory

McDowell (1998) offers a disjunctivist account of testimonial knowledge, which is based on his disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-1-p2

Respond to this claim on Isonomia

Build or challenge arguments with structured reasoning in the Digital Agora.

Join & respond

Embed this claim

<iframe
  src="https://www.isonomia.app/embed/claim/a2d9fb186b9e62310a413dedca6e1f98a60e67df2e0c9aec92715f1ecf891800"
  width="600"
  height="280"
  frameborder="0"
  style="border: 1px solid #e5e7eb; border-radius: 8px;"
  title="Isonomia Claim"
  loading="lazy"
></iframe>

Copy and paste into any website or forum that supports HTML.