Claima45bc6d266bff3fe9b23c74d28cfc464e5783b57d74aea487449e02874af9e35·Paper reconstruction — Kwok Chung Him et al. (2023), An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge

Claim

Milburn and Moon maintain that there cannot be a convincing unified epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge, but only disjunctivisms for particular memory types; the authors propose to answer this objection.

Evidence (1)

An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Framing the project: extending epistemological disjunctivism to memory

They hold that there cannot be a convincing unified epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge, but rather only a disjunctivism of particular sorts of memory knowledge.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-1-p5

Embed this claim

<iframe
  src="https://www.isonomia.app/embed/claim/a45bc6d266bff3fe9b23c74d28cfc464e5783b57d74aea487449e02874af9e35"
  width="600"
  height="280"
  frameborder="0"
  style="border: 1px solid #e5e7eb; border-radius: 8px;"
  title="Isonomia Claim"
  loading="lazy"
></iframe>

Copy and paste into any website or forum that supports HTML.

Respond to this claim on Isonomia

Build or challenge arguments with structured reasoning in the Digital Agora.

View full deliberation Join & respond