Milburn and Moon maintain that there cannot be a convincing unified epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge, but only disjunctivisms for particular memory types; the authors propose to answer this objection.

Evidence (1)

An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Framing the project: extending epistemological disjunctivism to memory

They hold that there cannot be a convincing unified epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge, but rather only a disjunctivism of particular sorts of memory knowledge.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-1-p5

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