Stored-memory cases do not defeat ED-M when the subject can reflectively access the fact that he remembers, even without access to a particular memorial experience.

Stored-memory cases do not defeat ED-M when the subject can reflectively access the fact that he remembers, even without access to a particular memorial experience.

• Because the access and distinguishability problems arise from disjunctivism's general commitment, ED-M can answer them in ways parallel to ED-P; and because remembering that p need not entail believing or knowing that p, its basis problem is dissolved.
• Even when no particular episode of learning or memorial experience is reflectively accessible, Michael can have reflective access to the fact that he remembers that snow is white.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  Michael does, however, have reflective access to the fact that he remembers.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p4

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  Michael does, however, have reflective access to the fact that he remembers.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p4
• ED-MS requires, in paradigmatic stored-memory knowledge, factive and reflectively accessible rational support.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  S has stored memory knowledge that p only if S ’ s belief that p is formed through having rational support which is reflectively accessible and factive.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p1

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  S has stored memory knowledge that p only if S ’ s belief that p is formed through having rational support which is reflectively accessible and factive.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p1
• Milburn and Moon object that stored memory is often unconscious, illustrated by Michael remembering that snow is white while asleep, which appears to create an access problem for ED-MS.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  Stored memory is often unconscious.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p2

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  Stored memory is often unconscious.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p2
• The sleeping case creates a general problem for access internalists, rather than one specific to ED-MS, since it would also imply that one has experiential-memory knowledge only when not asleep.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  The challenge here then is a general one for the access internalist, rather than a challenge that is specific to ED-MS.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p3

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  The challenge here then is a general one for the access internalist, rather than a challenge that is specific to ED-MS.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p3
• The lack of an experiential component in stored memory does not reduce the rational support provided by remembering; when challenged, Michael can cite remembering that snow is white.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  That this is devoid of the experiential component that is part of experiential memory does not lessen the rational support that it provides for his belief that snow is white.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p5

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  That this is devoid of the experiential component that is part of experiential memory does not lessen the rational support that it provides for his belief that snow is white.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p5
• In the quiz-show/Radford-like case, Michael correctly answers that Elizabeth I died in 1603 but lacks reflective access to the fact that he remembers it and may regard the answer as a guess.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  let us stipulate that he does not have reflective access to the fact that he remembers this.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p6

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  let us stipulate that he does not have reflective access to the fact that he remembers this.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p6

These are challenges this argument’s reasoning pattern must still withstand. Answering them on Isonomia strengthens the argument.

• Are there other relevant examples that would support a different conclusion?Answer under review
  Draft answer

  The paper considers a Radford-like quiz-show case in which Michael answers correctly but lacks reflective access to the fact that he remembers and takes the answer to be a guess. It treats this as importantly unlike the stored-memory case in which reflective access is present. Paper basis — "let us stipulate that he does not have reflective access to the fact that he remembers this." (An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge, p. 12). Reconstructed from Kwok Chung Him et al. (2023); machine-drafted from the paper, filed for review.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p6
• Is the property F genuinely causally or evidentially connected to property G?Open
• Is the example cited representative of the population?Open
• Are there relevant differences between the cited example and the case to which the conclusion is being applied?Open
• Is the number of examples sufficient to support the generalization?Open

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