The lack of an experiential component in stored memory does not reduce the rational support provided by remembering; when challenged, Michael can cite remembering that snow is white.
Evidence (2)
An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases
That this is devoid of the experiential component that is part of experiential memory does not lessen the rational support that it provides for his belief that snow is white.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p5
An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases
That this is devoid of the experiential component that is part of experiential memory does not lessen the rational support that it provides for his belief that snow is white.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p5
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