The sleeping case creates a general problem for access internalists, rather than one specific to ED-MS, since it would also imply that one has experiential-memory knowledge only when not asleep.
Evidence (2)
An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases
The challenge here then is a general one for the access internalist, rather than a challenge that is specific to ED-MS.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p3
An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases
The challenge here then is a general one for the access internalist, rather than a challenge that is specific to ED-MS.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p3
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