Radford-like cases lacking reflective access are nonparadigmatic, so ED-M is neutral on whether they constitute memory knowledge and they do not refute the account.

Radford-like cases lacking reflective access are nonparadigmatic, so ED-M is neutral on whether they constitute memory knowledge and they do not refute the account.

• Stored-memory cases do not defeat ED-M when the subject can reflectively access the fact that he remembers, even without access to a particular memorial experience.
• Even when no particular episode of learning or memorial experience is reflectively accessible, Michael can have reflective access to the fact that he remembers that snow is white.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  Michael does, however, have reflective access to the fact that he remembers.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p4

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  Michael does, however, have reflective access to the fact that he remembers.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p4
• ED-MS requires, in paradigmatic stored-memory knowledge, factive and reflectively accessible rational support.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  S has stored memory knowledge that p only if S ’ s belief that p is formed through having rational support which is reflectively accessible and factive.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p1

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  S has stored memory knowledge that p only if S ’ s belief that p is formed through having rational support which is reflectively accessible and factive.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p1
• Milburn and Moon object that stored memory is often unconscious, illustrated by Michael remembering that snow is white while asleep, which appears to create an access problem for ED-MS.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  Stored memory is often unconscious.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p2

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  Stored memory is often unconscious.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p2
• The sleeping case creates a general problem for access internalists, rather than one specific to ED-MS, since it would also imply that one has experiential-memory knowledge only when not asleep.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  The challenge here then is a general one for the access internalist, rather than a challenge that is specific to ED-MS.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p3

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  The challenge here then is a general one for the access internalist, rather than a challenge that is specific to ED-MS.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p3
• The lack of an experiential component in stored memory does not reduce the rational support provided by remembering; when challenged, Michael can cite remembering that snow is white.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  That this is devoid of the experiential component that is part of experiential memory does not lessen the rational support that it provides for his belief that snow is white.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p5

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  That this is devoid of the experiential component that is part of experiential memory does not lessen the rational support that it provides for his belief that snow is white.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p5
• In the quiz-show/Radford-like case, Michael correctly answers that Elizabeth I died in 1603 but lacks reflective access to the fact that he remembers it and may regard the answer as a guess.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  let us stipulate that he does not have reflective access to the fact that he remembers this.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p6

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Reply to objections from stored-memory cases and Radford-like inaccessible-support cases

  let us stipulate that he does not have reflective access to the fact that he remembers this.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-5-p6

These are challenges this argument’s reasoning pattern must still withstand. Answering them on Isonomia strengthens the argument.

• Is the context one where this definition appropriately applies?Open
• Is the definition of G acceptable and authoritative?Open
• Is the definition stipulative, lexical, or precising?Open
• Does a really have all the properties F₁, F₂, ... Fₙ listed?Open
• Are the defining properties necessary for G?Open
• Are the defining properties F₁, F₂, ... Fₙ sufficient for G?Open

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