Semantic and episodic memory can provide ED-M support, while beliefs merely inferred from memories are outside the relevant class of memory knowledge.

Semantic and episodic memory can provide ED-M support, while beliefs merely inferred from memories are outside the relevant class of memory knowledge.

• ED-M concerns paradigmatic propositional memory knowledge: a belief that p based on remembering that p, where remembering that p is factive and reflectively accessible.
• ED-M says that memory knowledge that p is acquired through rational support consisting in remembering that p; this support entails p and is reflectively accessible to the subject.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Defining the scope and formulation of epistemological disjunctivism of memory knowledge

  ED-M is a claim about memory knowledge that S acquires in virtue of being in possession of rational support R (i.e., remembering that p) for her belief that p , which is both factive

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-3-p3

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Defining the scope and formulation of epistemological disjunctivism of memory knowledge

  ED-M is a claim about memory knowledge that S acquires in virtue of being in possession of rational support R (i.e., remembering that p) for her belief that p , which is both factive

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-3-p3
• The authors delimit ED-M to memory knowledge that implies a propositional belief, rather than defending any particular psychological or philosophical taxonomy of memory.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Defining the scope and formulation of epistemological disjunctivism of memory knowledge

  epistemological disjunctivism of memory applies to memory knowledge where this implies a belief.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-3-p1

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Defining the scope and formulation of epistemological disjunctivism of memory knowledge

  epistemological disjunctivism of memory applies to memory knowledge where this implies a belief.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-3-p1
• Practical memory does not, on its face, produce propositional memory knowledge, while semantic and episodic memory are the obvious candidates to do so.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Defining the scope and formulation of epistemological disjunctivism of memory knowledge

  On the face of things, practical memory cannot, although it can produce knowledge-how.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-3-p5

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Defining the scope and formulation of epistemological disjunctivism of memory knowledge

  On the face of things, practical memory cannot, although it can produce knowledge-how.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-3-p5
• Semantic memory can supply ED-M support even when the subject does not remember the learning context, because she can still remember the proposition and be aware of that memory as supporting her belief.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Defining the scope and formulation of epistemological disjunctivism of memory knowledge

  This does not, however, imply that she cannot remember that Paris is the capital of France, nor that she is unable to be aware of her memory

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-3-p4

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Defining the scope and formulation of epistemological disjunctivism of memory knowledge

  This does not, however, imply that she cannot remember that Paris is the capital of France, nor that she is unable to be aware of her memory

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-3-p4
• The forms of memory relevant to propositional memory knowledge include episodic, semantic, experiential, propositional, and stored memory; practical memory may not be relevant because it yields knowledge-how rather than knowledge that p.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Defining the scope and formulation of epistemological disjunctivism of memory knowledge

  memory that yields belief that is solely of interest here.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-3-p2

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Defining the scope and formulation of epistemological disjunctivism of memory knowledge

  memory that yields belief that is solely of interest here.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-3-p2
• Apparent memory-belief cases are not memory knowledge when the belief's actual basis is inference rather than the remembered proposition.
  Evidence for this premise (2)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Defining the scope and formulation of epistemological disjunctivism of memory knowledge

  The relevant proposition has not been remembered, but it has been inferred.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-3-p6

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Defining the scope and formulation of epistemological disjunctivism of memory knowledge

  The relevant proposition has not been remembered, but it has been inferred.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-3-p6

These are challenges this argument’s reasoning pattern must still withstand. Answering them on Isonomia strengthens the argument.

• Does the case fit the category?Answer under review
  Draft answer

  The paper treats semantic and episodic memory as the obvious candidates for propositional memory knowledge, while practical memory produces knowledge-how rather than such knowledge. It also excludes cases in which the belief is actually based on inference rather than the remembered proposition. Paper basis — "On the face of things, practical memory cannot, although it can produce knowledge-how." (An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge, p. 8). Reconstructed from Kwok Chung Him et al. (2023); machine-drafted from the paper, filed for review.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-3-p5

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