So formulated, ED-M inherits ED-P's reconciliation of internalist and externalist intuitions and its explanation of ordinary justification by appeal to remembering that p.

So formulated, ED-M inherits ED-P's reconciliation of internalist and externalist intuitions and its explanation of ordinary justification by appeal to remembering that p.

• Semantic and episodic memory can provide ED-M support, while beliefs merely inferred from memories are outside the relevant class of memory knowledge.
• ED-M says that, in paradigmatic memory-knowledge cases, memory knowledge is grounded in rational support that is both factive and reflectively accessible.
  Evidence for this premise (3)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  In paradigmatic cases of memory knowledge, S has memory knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R , for this belief that p, which is both factive, R ’ s obtaining entails p , and reflectively accessible to S .

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p1

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  In paradigmatic cases of memory knowledge, S has memory knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R , for this belief that p, which is both factive, R ’ s obtaining entails p , and reflectively accessible to S .

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p1

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  In paradigmatic cases of memory knowledge, S has memory knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R , for this belief that p, which is both factive, R ’ s obtaining entails p , and reflectively accessible to S .

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p1
• ED-M illuminates the ordinary practice of justifying a memory belief that p by appealing to remembering that p: remembering is factive, and in paradigmatic experiential cases subjects can know by reflection that they remember.
  Evidence for this premise (3)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  a common practice in justifying one ’ s memory belief that p is to appeal to one ’ s remembering that p .

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p3

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  a common practice in justifying one ’ s memory belief that p is to appeal to one ’ s remembering that p .

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p3

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  a common practice in justifying one ’ s memory belief that p is to appeal to one ’ s remembering that p .

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p3
• ED-P blocks its basis problem by rejecting the claim that seeing that p entails knowing that p; analogously, ED-M can block its basis problem if it rejects RK.
  Evidence for this premise (3)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  if ED-M can reject the claim that remembering that p entails that knowing that p (RK), then ED-M can also block the presence of the basis problem.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p6

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  if ED-M can reject the claim that remembering that p entails that knowing that p (RK), then ED-M can also block the presence of the basis problem.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p6

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  if ED-M can reject the claim that remembering that p entails that knowing that p (RK), then ED-M can also block the presence of the basis problem.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p6
• Like ED-P, ED-M combines an internalist element (reflective accessibility) with an externalist element (factivity), and thus satisfies both kinds of intuition.
  Evidence for this premise (3)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  reflective accessibility is an internalist requirement and factivity is an externalist requirement.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p2

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  reflective accessibility is an internalist requirement and factivity is an externalist requirement.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p2

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  reflective accessibility is an internalist requirement and factivity is an externalist requirement.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p2
• ED-M can reject the first premise of the memory underdetermination sceptical paradox because a subject's factive memory support is unavailable to her counterpart in the five-minutes world and favors p over that hypothesis.
  Evidence for this premise (3)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  Granted that the rational support S possesses is factive, it favours the belief that p over the five-minutes-world hypothesis.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p4

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  Granted that the rational support S possesses is factive, it favours the belief that p over the five-minutes-world hypothesis.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p4

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  Granted that the rational support S possesses is factive, it favours the belief that p over the five-minutes-world hypothesis.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p4
• The access and distinguishability problems arise from disjunctivism's general commitment to factive, reflectively accessible support for contingent beliefs, rather than from its concern with any particular kind of knowledge.
  Evidence for this premise (3)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  the presence of both the access problem and the distinguishability problem has nothing to do with what kind of knowledge the version of disjunctivism is about.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p5

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  the presence of both the access problem and the distinguishability problem has nothing to do with what kind of knowledge the version of disjunctivism is about.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p5

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems

  the presence of both the access problem and the distinguishability problem has nothing to do with what kind of knowledge the version of disjunctivism is about.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p5

These are challenges this argument’s reasoning pattern must still withstand. Answering them on Isonomia strengthens the argument.

• Are the stated good consequences likely to occur?Answer under review
  Draft answer

  The paper argues that ED-M has the same two-part structure as ED-P: reflective accessibility supplies the internalist element and factivity the externalist element. It also maintains that this structure illuminates ordinary justification by remembering that p. Paper basis — "reflective accessibility is an internalist requirement and factivity is an externalist requirement." (An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge, p. 9). Reconstructed from Kwok Chung Him et al. (2023); machine-drafted from the paper, filed for review.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p2
• Are the good consequences significant enough to justify A?Answer under review
  Draft answer

  The paper treats reconciliation of internalist and externalist intuitions, together with the handling of objections, as attractions inherited through structural parity with ED-P. Its warrant presents these as grounds for the proposed ED-M account, conditional on the parity inference. Paper basis — This is a structural analogy or parity inference: because ED-M has the same factive-and-reflectively-accessible support structure as ED-P, it inherits ED-P's internalist/externalist attractions and its responses to objections generated by that structure; because its relevant entailment thesis (RK) is false in the same way as SK can be rejected, the basis objection is likewise dissolved. (from unit-4#w; no verbatim anchor). Reconstructed from Kwok Chung Him et al. (2023); machine-drafted from the paper, filed for review.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4#w
• Are there overlooked negative side‑effects outweighing the good?Open

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