Conclusion
ED-M can reject the first premise of the memory underdetermination paradox because factive memory support is unavailable to the subject's five-minutes-world counterpart and favours p over that hypothesis.
View claim pageArgument
ED-M can reject the first premise of the memory underdetermination paradox because factive memory support is unavailable to the subject's five-minutes-world counterpart and favours p over that hypothesis.
⟨ ⟩Argument from Analogy
Premises (7)
- ED-M says that, in paradigmatic memory-knowledge cases, memory knowledge is grounded in rational support that is both factive and reflectively accessible.Evidence for this premise (3)An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsIn paradigmatic cases of memory knowledge, S has memory knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R , for this belief that p, which is both factive, R ’ s obtaining entails p , and reflectively accessible to S .https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p1An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsIn paradigmatic cases of memory knowledge, S has memory knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R , for this belief that p, which is both factive, R ’ s obtaining entails p , and reflectively accessible to S .https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p1An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsIn paradigmatic cases of memory knowledge, S has memory knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R , for this belief that p, which is both factive, R ’ s obtaining entails p , and reflectively accessible to S .https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p1
- ED-M illuminates the ordinary practice of justifying a memory belief that p by appealing to remembering that p: remembering is factive, and in paradigmatic experiential cases subjects can know by reflection that they remember.Evidence for this premise (3)An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsa common practice in justifying one ’ s memory belief that p is to appeal to one ’ s remembering that p .https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p3An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsa common practice in justifying one ’ s memory belief that p is to appeal to one ’ s remembering that p .https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p3An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsa common practice in justifying one ’ s memory belief that p is to appeal to one ’ s remembering that p .https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p3
- ED-P blocks its basis problem by rejecting the claim that seeing that p entails knowing that p; analogously, ED-M can block its basis problem if it rejects RK.Evidence for this premise (3)An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsif ED-M can reject the claim that remembering that p entails that knowing that p (RK), then ED-M can also block the presence of the basis problem.https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p6An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsif ED-M can reject the claim that remembering that p entails that knowing that p (RK), then ED-M can also block the presence of the basis problem.https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p6An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsif ED-M can reject the claim that remembering that p entails that knowing that p (RK), then ED-M can also block the presence of the basis problem.https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p6
- Like ED-P, ED-M combines an internalist element (reflective accessibility) with an externalist element (factivity), and thus satisfies both kinds of intuition.Evidence for this premise (3)An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsreflective accessibility is an internalist requirement and factivity is an externalist requirement.https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p2An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsreflective accessibility is an internalist requirement and factivity is an externalist requirement.https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p2An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsreflective accessibility is an internalist requirement and factivity is an externalist requirement.https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p2
- ED-M can reject the first premise of the memory underdetermination sceptical paradox because a subject's factive memory support is unavailable to her counterpart in the five-minutes world and favors p over that hypothesis.Evidence for this premise (3)An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsGranted that the rational support S possesses is factive, it favours the belief that p over the five-minutes-world hypothesis.https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p4An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsGranted that the rational support S possesses is factive, it favours the belief that p over the five-minutes-world hypothesis.https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p4An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsGranted that the rational support S possesses is factive, it favours the belief that p over the five-minutes-world hypothesis.https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p4
- The access and distinguishability problems arise from disjunctivism's general commitment to factive, reflectively accessible support for contingent beliefs, rather than from its concern with any particular kind of knowledge.Evidence for this premise (3)An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsthe presence of both the access problem and the distinguishability problem has nothing to do with what kind of knowledge the version of disjunctivism is about.https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p5An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsthe presence of both the access problem and the distinguishability problem has nothing to do with what kind of knowledge the version of disjunctivism is about.https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p5An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problemsthe presence of both the access problem and the distinguishability problem has nothing to do with what kind of knowledge the version of disjunctivism is about.https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p5
Challenges & responses (0)
No one has tested this argument yet.
An unopposed argument is untested, not proven. Filing a rebut, undercut, or undermine is how its standing gets earned.
Pending critical questions (2)
These are challenges this argument’s reasoning pattern must still withstand. Answering them on Isonomia strengthens the argument.
- Are there critical differences?Answer under reviewDraft answer
The paper addresses the five-minutes-world case by maintaining that the subject's factive memory support is unavailable to the counterpart and therefore favours p over the sceptical hypothesis. It thus treats the proposed memory-specific contrast as compatible with the parallel anti-sceptical response. Paper basis — "Granted that the rational support S possesses is factive, it favours the belief that p over the five-minutes-world hypothesis." (An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge, p. 10). Reconstructed from Kwok Chung Him et al. (2023); machine-drafted from the paper, filed for review.
- Are the relevant similarities strong?Answer under reviewDraft answer
The paper bases the extension on ED-M's factive and reflectively accessible rational support, the same structural features attributed to ED-P. It uses this parity to argue that factive support distinguishes the subject from the five-minutes-world counterpart. Paper basis — "In paradigmatic cases of memory knowledge, S has memory knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R , for this belief that p, which is both factive, R ’ s obtaining entails p , and reflectively accessible to S ." (An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge, p. 9). Reconstructed from Kwok Chung Him et al. (2023); machine-drafted from the paper, filed for review.
Cited by
Cited by 1 · 0 contests
Builds on this (1)
Contests this (0)
No contest on file yet.
Embed this argument
<iframe src="https://www.isonomia.app/embed/argument/emVJAD96" width="600" height="400" frameborder="0" style="border:1px solid #e5e7eb;border-radius:8px;" title="Isonomia Argument" loading="lazy"></iframe>
Copy and paste into any website or forum that supports HTML.
Join the deliberation on Isonomia
Support, challenge, or extend this argument with structured reasoning in Isonomia.