ED-M illuminates the ordinary practice of justifying a memory belief that p by appealing to remembering that p: remembering is factive, and in paradigmatic experiential cases subjects can know by reflection that they remember.
Evidence (3)
An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems
a common practice in justifying one ’ s memory belief that p is to appeal to one ’ s remembering that p .
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p3
An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems
a common practice in justifying one ’ s memory belief that p is to appeal to one ’ s remembering that p .
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p3
An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Parity argument: ED-M inherits ED-P’s advantages and parallel responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems
a common practice in justifying one ’ s memory belief that p is to appeal to one ’ s remembering that p .
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-4-p3
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