Therefore, conditional on ED-P's success, a unified ED-M of paradigmatic memory knowledge is defensible against the principal objections and retains ED-P's theoretical advantages.

Therefore, conditional on ED-P's success, a unified ED-M of paradigmatic memory knowledge is defensible against the principal objections and retains ED-P's theoretical advantages.

• Radford-like cases lacking reflective access are nonparadigmatic, so ED-M is neutral on whether they constitute memory knowledge and they do not refute the account.
• The paper has shown that ED-M is preferable in each of those three respects.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Conclusion: defence of a unified ED-M for paradigmatic memory knowledge

  As shown, ED-M is preferable in these three aspects as well.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-6-p2
• Pritchard's ED-P has three theoretical advantages: it accommodates internalist and externalist intuitions, fits ordinary belief-justification practices, and addresses underdetermination-based radical scepticism.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Conclusion: defence of a unified ED-M for paradigmatic memory knowledge

  Pritchard ’ s ED-P has three theoretical advantages – it satisfies both internalist and externalist intuitions in epistemology, fits common practices in justifying beliefs, and offers a satisfactory way to cope with underdetermination-based radical scepticism.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-6-p1
• The sleeping-memory objection imposes an unnecessary requirement that ED-M can reject: that acquiring memory knowledge requires access to a particular memorial experience.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Conclusion: defence of a unified ED-M for paradigmatic memory knowledge

  the objection sets an unnecessary restriction, which ED-M can deny

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-6-p6
• Milburn and Moon object that memory knowledge can occur without access to the experience related to the remembered proposition, particularly during sleep.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Conclusion: defence of a unified ED-M for paradigmatic memory knowledge

  one can have memory knowledge that p without being able to access her experience related to p , especially when she is sleeping.

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-6-p4
• The authors' response is that this objection targets access internalism generally, rather than ED-MS or ED-M specifically.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Conclusion: defence of a unified ED-M for paradigmatic memory knowledge

  such an objection is a general challenge for access internalism rather than a specific one for ED-MS (and also ED-M).

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-6-p5
• ED-M can use ED-P's defensive responses to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge — Conclusion: defence of a unified ED-M for paradigmatic memory knowledge

  ED-M also can make use of the responses in defence of ED-P to the three main worries

  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/an-epistemological-disjunctivist-account-of-memory-knowledge/14B783777BF7638A1B1D2F20750466D7#unit-6-p3

These are challenges this argument’s reasoning pattern must still withstand. Answering them on Isonomia strengthens the argument.

• Are the stated good consequences likely to occur?Open
• Are there overlooked negative side‑effects outweighing the good?Open
• Are the good consequences significant enough to justify A?Open

No one has cited this argument yet.

No arguments cite this one yet — no one has built on or contested it. That is an absence of engagement, not a finding of soundness. Build on or contest it on Isonomia to change that.