Because affect intensity can dissociate from degree intensity, TG's null emotive-predicate analysis does not explain the required relation between intensified degree and emotivity; expressive intensification explains their convergence specifically in exclamatives.

Because affect intensity can dissociate from degree intensity, TG's null emotive-predicate analysis does not explain the required relation between intensified degree and emotivity; expressive intensification explains their convergence specifically in exclamatives.

• Even restricting TG's account to Type 2 does not yield equivalence with emotive-predicate assertions, because Type 2 meaning components resist direct denial and are only indirectly relevant as question responses.
• Even if emotive-predicate complements default to high-degree readings, those defaults can be pragmatically explained or compositionally enriched, and do not eliminate the separation of the two intensities.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  In search of an exclamatory illocutionary force — Intensity, affect, and the limits of the rival analysis

  the intensity of a ff ect and the intensity of the degree in its source do come apart easily in the case of truth-conditional emotive predicates.

  https://doi.org/10.1515/tl-2025-2007#unit-5-p5
• For normally or near-normally distributed values, extreme degrees will more often trigger counter-expectation because they have low probability.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  In search of an exclamatory illocutionary force — Intensity, affect, and the limits of the rival analysis

  extreme degrees (i.e., degrees close to the ends of the distribution) will trigger counter-expectation more often because they have low probability.

  https://doi.org/10.1515/tl-2025-2007#unit-5-p2
• This separation between affect intensity and degree intensity is maintained in declaratives with truth-conditional emotive predicates such as amazed and surprised.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  In search of an exclamatory illocutionary force — Intensity, affect, and the limits of the rival analysis

  This separation is maintained in declaratives with emotive predicates like amazed or surprised

  https://doi.org/10.1515/tl-2025-2007#unit-5-p4
• Intensity of affect and intensity of the degree that is the affect's source are in principle distinct, although they can sometimes be intuitively linked.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  In search of an exclamatory illocutionary force — Intensity, affect, and the limits of the rival analysis

  intensity of a ff ect and intensity of the degree in the source of the a ff ect are two separate things

  https://doi.org/10.1515/tl-2025-2007#unit-5-p1
• Strong affect can concern a non-extreme degree, while an extreme degree can produce only mild affect; the examples with mildly amazed at extreme height and extremely surprised at average height illustrate this dissociation.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  In search of an exclamatory illocutionary force — Intensity, affect, and the limits of the rival analysis

  one can experience strong a ff ect about a non-extreme degree, and conversely, an extreme degree can yield only mild a ff ect.

  https://doi.org/10.1515/tl-2025-2007#unit-5-p3
• In Esipova's expressive-intensification analysis, exclamatives are a subcase in which degree intensification and affect do converge: the truth-conditional component says that the degree warrants use of the expressive form, while producing that form expresses affect.
  Evidence for this premise (1)

  In search of an exclamatory illocutionary force — Intensity, affect, and the limits of the rival analysis

  the two do indeed seem to come together

  https://doi.org/10.1515/tl-2025-2007#unit-5-p6

Critical questions are the challenges this argument’s reasoning pattern must withstand.

• Is there a plausible alternative hypothesis that has not been considered or that would explain the facts at least as well?
  Answer

  The paper considers Esipova's expressive-intensification analysis as an alternative to a truth-conditional emotive-predicate treatment. On that analysis, degree intensification and affect converge because the truth-conditional degree warrants use of the expressive force. Paper basis — "the two do indeed seem to come together" (In search of an exclamatory illocutionary force, p. 25). Reconstructed from Maria Esipova (2025); machine-drafted from the paper, filed for review.

  https://doi.org/10.1515/tl-2025-2007#unit-5-p6
• Are the criteria used to judge H 'best' (scope, simplicity, mechanism, prior probability) appropriate for this domain, and are they applied consistently across the alternatives?
  Answer

  The paper evaluates the analyses by conceptual and compositional adequacy: an attitude-assertion analysis must independently explain both the required degree structure and the relation between degree intensification and emotivity. Paper basis — Conceptual and compositional adequacy warrant: an analysis that treats exclamatives as assertions of truth-conditional attitude content must independently explain both why their required degree structure follows and how degree intensity yields affective intensity. Since truth-conditional emotive predicates permit these dimensions to come apart, and TG's proposed embedding does not itself require d (from unit-5#w; no verbatim anchor). Reconstructed from Maria Esipova (2025); machine-drafted from the paper, filed for review.

  https://doi.org/10.1515/tl-2025-2007#unit-5#w

These are challenges this argument’s reasoning pattern must still withstand. Answering them on Isonomia strengthens the argument.

• Could the facts be jointly explained by a conjunction of weaker causes rather than a single dominant H?Open
• Could the body of facts F itself be an artifact of selection, measurement, or reporting bias rather than a real phenomenon needing causal explanation?Open
• Does H actually explain the full body of facts F, or only a salient subset?Open

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