ED-P is theoretically attractive because it fits ordinary appeals to seeing that p, addresses underdetermination scepticism, and has proposed replies to the access, distinguishability, and basis problems.
Pritchardean ED-P characterizes paradigmatic perceptual knowledge as supported by factive and reflectively accessible rational support, thereby combining externalist and internalist requirements.
In paradigmatic perceptual knowledge, ED-P requires S to have factive and reflectively accessible rational support for believing p.
Ordinary justification of a perceptual belief that p commonly appeals to seeing that p; ED-P can accommodate this because seeing that p is factive and reflectively knowable.
Reflective accessibility supplies an internalist constraint: grounds for knowledgeable beliefs must be accessible to the subject.
Factivity supplies an externalist constraint connecting knowledge with truth-conducive belief formation.
ED-P rejects UP1 for paradigmatic perceptual beliefs: S's factive support is unavailable to her envatted counterpart and is therefore better support, favouring p over the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis.
The underdetermination sceptical paradox combines the claims that no support favours everyday perceptual proposition E over incompatible sceptical hypothesis H, that lacking such favouring support precludes rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, and that widespread perceptual knowledge exists.
Are the stated good consequences likely to occur?
Are the good consequences significant enough to justify A?
Are there overlooked negative side‑effects outweighing the good?
Paper reconstruction — Kwok Chung Him et al. (2023), An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge