Stored-memory cases do not defeat ED-M when the subject can reflectively access the fact that he remembers, even without access to a particular memorial experience.
Because the access and distinguishability problems arise from disjunctivism's general commitment, ED-M can answer them in ways parallel to ED-P; and because remembering that p need not entail believing or knowing that p, its basis problem is dissolved.
Even when no particular episode of learning or memorial experience is reflectively accessible, Michael can have reflective access to the fact that he remembers that snow is white.
ED-MS requires, in paradigmatic stored-memory knowledge, factive and reflectively accessible rational support.
Milburn and Moon object that stored memory is often unconscious, illustrated by Michael remembering that snow is white while asleep, which appears to create an access problem for ED-MS.
The sleeping case creates a general problem for access internalists, rather than one specific to ED-MS, since it would also imply that one has experiential-memory knowledge only when not asleep.
The lack of an experiential component in stored memory does not reduce the rational support provided by remembering; when challenged, Michael can cite remembering that snow is white.
In the quiz-show/Radford-like case, Michael correctly answers that Elizabeth I died in 1603 but lacks reflective access to the fact that he remembers it and may regard the answer as a guess.
Are there other relevant examples that would support a different conclusion?
Is the property F genuinely causally or evidentially connected to property G?
Is the example cited representative of the population?
Are there relevant differences between the cited example and the case to which the conclusion is being applied?
Is the number of examples sufficient to support the generalization?
Paper reconstruction — Kwok Chung Him et al. (2023), An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge